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Introduction  
International community often tasks itself with conflict resolution even when it is not directly 
involved in the outbreak thereof. Even though I believe that the international community has 
no direct responsibility to intervene, when they do so it should not result in further escalating 
the conflict. However, this sometimes ends up being the case. A type of conflict I believe to 
be most problematic to intervene in is civil war. Civil wars are often complex, caused by 
many underlying problems that build up until they make a state turn on its citizens or the other 
way around. In the case of Yugoslav wars there were many issues that built up over the 
decades that eventually made the country implode. What makes them so tricky for 
international community to intervene in is the fact that it is often impossible to tell who is 
fighting who and which side is in the right, especially at the beginning of the conflict. 
Furthermore, different international actors may have different ideas on which side is ‘bad’ and 
which is ‘good’, as is evident from the current conflict in Syria. 
In the safety of EU, up until recently security was taken for granted and war was 
thought as a relic of the past. However, situation along the Eastern borders as well as across 
the Atlantic has compromised the idea that security is always guaranteed. Until now EU had 
the luxury of being painstakingly slow and overly bureaucratic in making any progress in 
forming a common defence. However, in the light of the conflict in Ukraine and Syria, and 
the sudden uncertainty in reliance of NATO, EU has begun to further explore the option of 
becoming a hard power capable of conflict intervention. But how can the EU make sure not to 
repeat the intervention mistakes made in the past? A good place to start is exploring what 
exactly the mistakes of the past were, and possibly the greatest source on the past intervention 
are the Yugoslav wars. 
 Yugoslav wars were the first major conflict on European continent after the WWII, 
making them also the first conflict that the newly formed EU was tasked with resolving by the 
international community. It brought to light all of the weaknesses in EU’s abilities to coerce 
actors involved in conflict into implementing its diplomatic solutions. While EU’s coercive 
powers have in theory grown since then, reality shows it time and again resorting to the use of 
soft power. Therefore it is necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of this soft power in order to 
conclude if it is enough in the face of conflict resolution, or should there be another option? 
 My interest in the topic of EU involvement in Yugoslav wars sparked during my BA 
thesis research. Since my BA thesis is about the Srebrenica massacre, which happened during 
the Bosnian war, I have thoroughly researched the Yugoslav wars, and the lack of the EU 
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involvement from the outset caught my attention. I decided to follow up on this subject in my 
master research. My connection to the Yugoslav wars and the EU is not only academic but 
also personal. I was born in the midst of the Croatian war and my family has had to flee their 
home and seek refuge, in part because of the failure of the international community to prevent 
the escalation of the conflict in the region. For these reasons I find it important to find the 
ways in which these wars can help shape the future of the EU military intervention. 
The topic of this research is EU as an actor in international conflict resolution using 
the case of Yugoslav wars. In order to reach the conclusion on this topic, the following 
questions are answered first: How did EU involvement in Yugoslav wars progress during and 
after the conflicts? How did the actorness of EU during and after Yugoslav wars compare to 
other major international actors, UN and NATO and what were the mistakes in EU’s approach?  
This research is relevant in the light of current rapid destabilization of relations with 
Russia and Turkey, conflicts along the eastern borders and new discourse in respect to the US, 
and therefore NATO brought along by the recent change in leadership. This thesis fills the 
gap in the current debate on the future of EU defense by showcasing the consequences of 
EU’s inability to intervene as a hard power in a case where NATO did not immediately take 
over as a leading military actor. There is no existing research to be found that encompasses all 
of the elements of this thesis. Literature that covers some aspects of this topic exists, yet it is 
smaller in scope, mainly focused on one of the actors in one of the conflicts, or all of the 
conflicts but without the focus on the actors. Furthermore, little can be found exclusively on 
the involvement of the EU.  
This thesis is organized into three main parts: introduction, followed by literature 
review and methodology, research and discussion, and finally conclusion. Literature review 
chapter contains review of secondary literature that is the most relevant to my topic, and 
identifies its gaps that shall be built upon in this research. Methodology chapter follows 
directly after, containing theoretical framework and a more detailed explanation of the form 
and content of this research. Second part consists of my main research, divided into four 
chapters. First three chapters contain information about the wars and international actors 
involvement during and post-conflict. Fourth chapter contains short chapters conclusion and 
discussion. In the Conclusion I shall revisit the main points made in this research and also 
answer the questions asked in the introduction.  
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1. Literature review  
Yugoslav wars, the CFSP and the EU military intervention are salient topics in their own 
respect, and libraries can be filled by what has been written about each of them individually. 
However, literature that combines these topics is quite rare to come across, especially the one 
that is contemporary. The literature used in this chapter provides quality information about the 
military involvement of several international actors in different Yugoslav wars, but it lacks 
the specific focus on evolution of the EU involvement and the comparative aspect that this 
research is trying to provide.  
 Military Intervention and the European Union (2001) by Martin Ortega is a Chailot 
Paper published by The Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union. As is 
evident from the title, this paper presents a research on the topic of the EU’s military 
intervention. Ortega researches the history as well as the current implications for the Union’s 
involvement as a military actor. He questions the legality and the legitimacy of the union’s 
use of armed force in sovereign states, and he uses all of the countries in which the EU, or the 
EC, was involved as a military force as a case study.
1
 In the beginning of the book he 
distinguishes between different kinds of military interventions wherein Croatia and Bosnia are 
defined as collective interventions and Kosovo as a humanitarian one.
2
 This paper is an 
academic source of technical information on military intervention in general and the EU 
military intervention in specific and it also contains plenty information on the conflicts that 
are the topic of this research. The downside of it is that it is rather old so the Kosovo conflict 
was analyzed from then contemporary point of view without the hindsight of how the conflict 
ends. Nevertheless, even though it is old, the information it contains is not dated, and it still is 
a valuable read for the purposes of my research. Other authors I came across did not use as 
wide of a sample as Ortega in their works, but their articles still offer valuable information on 
the EU’s involvement in the conflicts.  
 The inexistence of EC military involvement in Croatian war is very evident from the 
moment one starts researching it. Authors researching this topic take notice of the rather 
confused response of the international community, including the EC, at the beginning of this 
conflict. As Susan Woodward puts it in Balkan Tragedy ‘…the Yugoslav conflict was not of 
sufficient strategic or national interest to contribute the political and military resources 
necessary to end the war.’3 However, according to Radan, the EC was involved as a political 
                                                            
1 Ortega 2001, p. 1-4 
2 Ibid, p. 6-7; 14 
3 Woodward 1995, p. 7 
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actor. In the chapter The international response to and course of the Yugoslav secessions in 
his book on the breakup of Yugoslavia, Peter Radan does identify EC as the main 
international institution involved in the conflict, despite the fact that the member states were 
deeply divided on the course of action. For example, while Germany and Belgium supported 
the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, Spain and France wanted Yugoslavia to remain 
one country. Radan sees the EC statements on Yugoslavia given by the Council at the 
beginning of the war as a set of ambiguous, loose compromises that showcase the internal 
divide on the issue. He lists countless EC declarations concerning territorial integrity of 
Yugoslavia from 1991 and 1992, which reflect how confused the EC, and the international 
community as a whole, were about the conflict early on.
4
 Peen Rodt and Wolf argue in 
European Union Conflict Management in the Western Balkans that the EC was not only not 
helping by the lack of military response, it was making the situation even worse by the 
inadequate use of soft power. She argues that the EC at the time failed to recognize that the 
Yugoslav National Army (JNA) has become the army of Serbian Nationalists, and that 
because of the arms embargo imposed on the region, EC severely impaired Croats and 
Muslims ability to defend themselves.
5
 
 Compared to the war in Croatia, War in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) is much 
more salient amongst researchers. As Robert Dover notices in The EU and the Bosnian Civil 
War 1992 –95 the beginning of the Bosnian war coincides with the new CFSP, which gave 
EU new instruments to respond to international crises. He, however, focuses on shortcomings 
of the EU compared to the immense expectations it was burdened with, especially on the hard 
power front. He believes that the shortcomings of the EU military response were caused by 
internal division, and the influence of the US on EU military interventions. He concludes that 
the EU political and financial support of the UN peacekeepers, and the 14000 peacekeepers 
that EU member states provided, are the highlights of the EU military involvement in Bosnian 
war.
6
 In The EU’s post-Conflict Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Anna Juncos states 
that, even though EU did not shine as a military actor in this conflict, all of its use of military 
power later on stems from it, including the ones in Bosnia after the war.
7
 
In A milestone in the history of the EU Alistair Shepherd presents a comprehensive 
research on the Kosovo war and the EU, and unlike Ortega he does it with knowledge of how 
                                                            
4 Radan 2002, p. 160-163 
5 Peen Rodt and Wolf 2012, p. 417 
6 Dover 2005, p. 299-311 
7 Juncos 2005, p. 99 
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the conflict ends, and what its consequences are, since he is published in 2009. Shepherd 
establishes the importance of the Kosovo conflict for the CFSP at the very beginning of his 
article. After the failure to act in Bosnia and the complete lack of action in Croatia, Kosovo 
was the time for the EU to demonstrate its abilities to act as one in international conflict 
situations. Shepherd stresses the point that other authors have made in discussing the previous 
Yugoslav conflicts - the EU needed to show that it is its job to protect the peace in Europe, 
and not NATOs. Yet he argues the EU failed to protect the fragile peace to the extent that it 
should have, especially regarding its use of hard power. However, in comparison to the 
Croatian conflict, EU did in the time of the Kosovo conflict command over actual militants, 
pledged from the individual member states. This already shows the staggering difference to 
seven years prior, which was a direct result of the conflicts raging in the western Balkans.
8
 
Yet, Peen Rodt and Wolf do not see this as an achievement but as yet another failure of the 
CFSP. The simultaneous use of soft and hard power was just not something that the EU was 
ready to properly execute, and even though the military was present, a proper strategy was 
lacking.
9
 
Academics have been researching the role of international community in the Yugoslav 
wars from the onset of the conflicts, as seen in this literature review. However the research 
they do tends to focus mainly on one conflict, or on all on the conflicts in very broad lines. 
What this thesis will bring to the existing literature is a comparative perspective on the EU 
military involvement in Yugoslavia. Not only is the EU involvement going to be compared 
with itself chronologically throughout the wars, it will be compared with the other 
international actors who have played an important role. 
 
                                                            
8 Shepherd 2009, p. 513-518 
9 Peen Rodt and Wolf 2012, p. 419 
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2. Methodology 
In this research I shall follow the Yugoslav wars chronologically and analyze the involvement 
of the EU, UN and NATO, and note the changes in EU policy on which the wars had a direct 
effect. I will use Comparative Historical Analyses as a theoretical approach in order to 
compare EU military involvement in each of the Yugoslav wars, as well as the EU 
involvement in contrast to involvement of other military actors. The reason why I believe that 
this theoretical approach is the best suited one for this research is because it not only focuses 
on identifying the differences between the units of comparison, but on identifying the causes 
for these differences as well. To deeply analyze the nature of EU involvement and make 
suggestions for the future thereof I will refer to the theory of power in international politics. I 
will base this paragraph mainly on Robert Kagan’s research on differences between Europe 
and the US in their approach to international security and diplomacy. Since the focus of this 
thesis is not to look at different perspectives on international involvement in Yugoslav war, 
the sources that I will be using for the main part of this research are mainly primary 
documents produced by the actors themselves. Majority of these sources are UN and NATO 
resolutions, EU decisions, directives and regulations, official press releases and speeches. 
 
2.1 Comparative Historical Analyses 
Comparative Historical Analyses is a theory in historical sciences that uses comparison as a 
tool to deeper analyze historical events.
10
 The main interest of historians working with this 
theory are historical events that could not be adequately explained unless compared to other 
developments, such as the raise of social-nationalism in postwar Germany.
11
 According to one 
of the main historians practicing this approach, Stefan Berger, it is unavoidable to compare 
historical events and developments, unless the historian wants to limit themselves to “listing 
dates and events”. 12  Most historians who choose this approach want to fully explain 
developments in a certain society, which is impossible to do unless taking into account other 
societies around it, because practically no society developed in full isolation.
13
  
It was in fact the historians of holocaust that developed this discipline in order to 
discover why was it Germany in particular that took a dark turn in the early 20
th
 century, and 
not other European or North African states that were in a similar social and economic 
                                                            
10 Mahoney and Dietrich, Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. Cambridge 2003. 
11 Berger 2003, p. 161 
12 Berger 2003, p. 161 
13 Berger 2003, p. 164-165 
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situation.
14
 This type of historical comparing where the aim is to compare differences between 
objects of comparison is called asymmetrical historical comparison.
15
 Asymmetrical 
comparison focuses on one object of comparison very narrowly, while focusing more loosely 
on other objects of comparison, since their purpose in this type of research is to further 
explain the main object.
16
 This process of researching the uniqueness of a particular object of 
comparison in respect to others is called individualizing, and it helps prevent the comparative 
research from becoming a mere list of parallels.
17
 Most comparative historians will focus on 
both similarities and differences between the actors, although one actor will always be the 
main point of comparison.
18
 This is the approach I will be taking in this research because it 
focuses on why the EU acted differently than NATO and the UN, more so than on the actions 
that were the same. Although I will devote a lot of attention to all of the actors the main object 
of comparison for this thesis is the EU, while NATO and the UN serve to further shine a light 
on EU’s actions and behavior. 
 The aim of comparative history is not to simply list similarities or differences between 
events and actors, but also to identify underlying reasons for these differences and track their 
changes overtime.
19
 This approach fits well into this research since I will not only focus on 
differences between international actors involvement in Yugoslav wars individually, but also 
their development over the duration of the conflicts. Objects of comparison may vary greatly, 
and comparative history allows for any objects of comparison may be compared, and they do 
not necessarily have to be of the same nature, such as states to states or political regimes to 
political regimes.
20
 However, the results are better if the objects of comparison are similar in 
function.
21
 Although most comparative historians focus on nation states as their objects of 
comparison, other objects may be religions and societies, or in the case of this research, 
international organizations.
22
 
  
 
 
                                                            
14 Welskopp 2010, p. 2-3, Kocka 199, p. 48 
15 Kocka 1999, p. 1 
16 Ibid, p. 1 
17 Berger 2003, p. 163 
18 Berger 2003, p. 163, p. 168 
19 Kocka 1999, p. 5 
20 Berger 2003, p. 167 
21 Ibid 
22 Ibid, p. 162 
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2.2 Power in International Politics 
Power is a term central to international politics. A quote from Mearsheimer “What money is 
to economics, power is to international relations” serves as a great example order to 
demonstrate exactly how central.
23
 Even though there are many definitions of power, the one 
most people will think of when they conceptualize this abstract term, is the realist definition. 
It refers to power as “the ability of states to use material resources to get others to do what 
they otherwise would not”.24  While this definition is not be-all and end-all of power in 
international politics, it serves well for the purpose of this research because it best describes 
ways of implementing peace by international actors involved in Yugoslav wars. Power is best 
imagined as a spectrum of means to coerce other actors.
25
 This spectrum ranges from hard to 
soft power.
26
 Hard power is a more traditional view of power and it refers to using coercion to 
force other actors to comply with something they would otherwise not comply with.
27
 Soft 
power on the other hand, makes use of non-coercive means such as international institutions, 
diplomacy, economic and cultural appeal.
28
 EU is commonly used as an example of soft 
power, while the US is used as an example of hard power.
29
 
Europe and the US have very different approach to international relations, yet this 
difference in approach has not always been the same as it is today. Before the World Wars 
European nations relied more heavily on power politics, readily using military means to 
achieve their political goals.
30
 At this time US was weaker and more reliant on international 
law, making the situation prior to the World Wars a mirror of the present.
31
 Europe was 
extremely weakened as a result of the World Wars, and has since than relied on US to provide 
security.
32
 Since the end of the cold war EU has grown surprisingly quickly as a soft power, 
however, it has fallen short on its promises of becoming capable of utilizing significant hard 
power.
33
 On the other hand, US has continued investing in military technology and it has 
further advanced its hard power capabilities.
34
 Today EU approach is based on diplomacy.
35
 
                                                            
23 Mearsheimer 2007, p. 7 
24 Barnett and Duval 2005, p. 40 
25 Ibid, p. 45 
26 Ibid, p. 43 
27 Nye 1990, p. 164-167; 171 
28 Ibid, p. 167; 170 
29 Cooper 2004, p. 1 
30 Ibid, p. 8-11 
31 Ibid 
32 Ibid, p. 18-20 
33 Ibid, p. 21-22 
34 Ibid, p. 23 
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European philosophy on problem resolution revolves around finding a peaceful solution by 
negotiating with the actors, using economic means to either punish or reward them depending 
on their level of cooperation.
36
 Economic means are the EU’s main way to influence third 
parties.
37
 EU also utilizes international institutions and relies more greatly on international 
law.
38
 On the other hand, US relies more heavily on the use of force for problem resolution.
39
 
US also tends to be very quick to use hard power because of their unique view of the world 
and their threat perception.
40
 While US sees world issues as very black and white, the EU 
view includes a broader spectrum.
41
 Although there is a lot of diversity between European 
nations in their approach, a fundamental difference between US and Europe remains.
42
  
 
2.3 Structure and Content 
There are four chapters in the main part of the research, each designated to one of the civil 
wars following the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The form of the chapters will be kept the 
same for the reasons of consistency and clarity, but the content will be different. Reason 
behind this is because the EU, as well as the rest of the international community, were 
uniquely involved in each conflict. Because the timeline of the wars coincides with the 
transition of the European Community into the European Union the term EU will sometimes 
actually refer to EC. Term Serbia will refer to the country consisting mainly of ethnic Serbs 
with a central government run from Belgrade, whether it was at the time called Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia or Serbia and Montenegro. Slovenian war of independence is not an 
independent part of this research due to the fact that it was a minor conflict, lasting only ten 
days.
43
 However, it is referred to in the chapter on Croatian war because some aspects of it are 
relevant to the international involvement in the Croatian conflict. 
First three chapters of the research are descriptive and provide information for further 
discussion. The topic of the first chapter is war in Croatia, and the information provided in the 
beginning of the chapter is short background to the conflict, summary of the main events that 
occurred during the conflict, humanitarian consequences and the most important postwar 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
35 Kagan 2003, p. 5 
36 Ibid 
37 Ibid, 4-5 
38 Ibid 
39 Ibid, p. 4 
40 Ibid, p. 37 
41 Ibid 
42 Ibid, p. 5-6 
43 Brändström and Malešič 2004, p. 55 
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events. After the background comes the most important part of the chapter, which is analyses 
of main international actors’ involvement in the conflict: UN, NATO and EU. In this section 
main actions undertaken by these actors during and after the war in order to achieve and 
maintain peace are described. Following two chapters, Bosnia and Kosovo, have the same 
outline as Croatia. Final chapter is named discussion and it makes use of the information 
provided in previous chapters for analyses and discussion of actions undertaken by the EU in 
comparison to that of the other two actors. The focus is placed on identifying mistakes in the 
common response of the international community, and the EU in particular. Options for 
alternative action that could have been implemented instead are provided as an aspect of this 
thesis that focuses on future of EU in international conflict resolution. Conclusion of this 
research contains a brief summary of the descriptive part of the research and the discussion, 
the answer to the main question stated in the introduction and a final reflection on the issue of 
EU conflict intervention. 
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3. Croatia 
3.1 Background 
On 25 April 1991 an independence referendum was held in Croatia and the majority of the 
citizens, 93,4%, voted for Croatian independence from Yugoslavia.
44
 In June of the same year 
the Croatian Parliament declared independence.
45
 Serb minority population in Croatia was 
fundamentally opposed to this development.
46
 Days after the declaration of independence the 
armed conflict began between Serb-led Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) and Croatian Army 
of the newly formed Republic of Croatia.
47
 First ceasefire was reached in September of 1991 
in Igalo, but it was short lived.
48
 Conflict continued despite the ceasefire agreement, as around 
one quarter of Croatian territory was annexed by JNA and the Croatian Serbs to form a 
republic called Republika Srpska Kraijna (RSK) in late 1991.
49
 In its constitution, RSK 
referred to itself as an ethnically Serb republic.
50
 In January of 1992 Vance ceasefire was 
reached, a lasting ceasefire agreement that came after fourteen failed ones.
51
 This ceasefire 
was a part of the UNSC presented Vance plan, a peace plan aimed at solving the ethnic 
question in the conflict and maintaining the ceasefire.
52
 However, as seen from the UN 
documents further in this chapter, ceasefire agreement was often breached. 
The beginning of the end of the war started in August 1995 when Croatian armed 
forces launched a major operation, Operation Storm, 
that in only four days banished a fifth of a million Serbs 
from RSK.
53
 Croatian war officially ended on 
November 12, 1995 after signing of the Basic 
Agreement on The Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, 
and Western Sirmium, better known as Erdut 
agreement.
54
 Agreement was signed by the 
                                                            
44 Republička komisija za provedbu referenduma 1991, p. 1 
45 UN 1992: ‘Application of the Republic of Croatia for admission 
to membership in the United Nations', p. 2 
46 Barić 2014, p. 212 
47 United Nations General Assembly 1992: ‘Forty-seventh session’, p. 2 
48 UNSC 1992: ‘Resolution 713 (1991)’, p. 43 
49 Barić 2014, p. 211-212 
50 Skupština Srpske Autonomne Oblasti Krajine 1991, p. 94 
51 Woodward 1995, p. 189 
52 Barić 2014, p. 211 
53 United Nations Economic and Social Council 1996: ‘Question of the Human Rights’ 
54 UCDP 1995: ‘The Erdut Agreement’, p. 1 
Image 1 Serbian refugees leaving RSK during 
Operation Storm 
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representatives of Serbia and Croatia, and witnessed by the representatives of the UN and the 
US.
55
 
 Number of dead is still a highly disputed topic in all of the major Yugoslav wars, the 
war in Croatia being no exception, and there is no reliable definite number of dead available. 
The UN estimates in 1992, the year of Vance ceasefire, are around 4.200 dead and 18000 
missing who are presumed dead.
56
 Issue of displaced persons was the one of immense 
proportions that continues to plague the region even now, decades after the wars ended. 
Council of Europe Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography estimated the 
number of displaced persons at around 440.000, from which 75.000 have returned to their 
homes at the time the report was published.  
Croatia gained international recognition quickly, and it saw the fastest postwar 
economic transition of all former Yugoslav republics.
57
 In 1992 Croatia became a member of 
the United Nations. NATO membership was obtained in 2009, and since 2013 it has been the 
newest Member State of the European Union. 
 
3.2 International Actors 
3.2.1 The United Nations 
Although not the first to get involved, the UN was arguably the main international player in 
Croatian war of independence in terms of time, funds and both military and non-military 
personnel invested in finding a peaceful solution for the conflict. The UN got officially 
involved in Croatian war in September of 1991 when the UNSC issued resolution 713 (1991), 
first in line of numerous resolution concerning the conflicts in Yugoslavia.
58
 In this resolution 
Security Council condemned the fighting and expressed concern of its effect on the Yugoslav 
territory, and that of the neighboring countries. Furthermore, the UN made an attempt to urge 
the belligerents to respect the 1991 ceasefire agreement in Igalo.
59
 To assure compliance, a 
complete embargo on weapons and military equipment was implemented.
60
 This ceasefire, as 
well as several other ceasefire attempts, was not respected. The violence had continued, 
forcing the government of Yugoslavia to request a peacekeeping mission, which the UN 
                                                            
55 Ibid, p. 2 
56 United Nations General Assembly 1992: ‘Forty-seventh session’, p. 2 
57 Moore and Vamvakidis 2007, p. 25 
58 UNSC 1991: ‘Resolution 713 (1991)’, p. 42 
59 Ibid, p. 42-43 
60 Ibid, p. 43 
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strongly considered in the following meeting.
61
 On 21 February 1992 the UN delivered, and 
the newly created United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was sent on a 
peacekeeping mission to Yugoslavia for an initial duration of 12 months, which was later 
extended.
62
 
To any Croat or Serb who has lived in conflict zones during the Croatian war of 
independence, including myself, UN’s UNPROFOR is synonymous with the involvement of 
international community. Even though many international actors worked hard on finding a 
diplomatic solution to the conflict, the boots on the ground that brought relief and protection 
were the only ones innocent citizens affected by the conflict noticed. Numerous countries 
from all continents participated in the ever expanding UNPROFOR mission, including Russia, 
Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
63
 UNPROFOR had established protected 
areas, which constituted of areas in Croatia where ethnic violence was imminent because of 
miss-balance between the number of Serbs and Croats.
64
 Their initial mandate was to protect 
and demilitarize said areas and to assure respect for ceasefire agreements.
65
 However, this 
task proved to be near impossible because of the consistent violation of ceasefire agreements, 
and continued formation of new paramilitary armed forces in the protected areas UNPROFOR 
tried to demilitarize.
66
 Furthermore, ethnic cleansing became an apparent problem in the 
protected areas, a gruesome violation of human rights that Yugoslav wars grew to become 
identified with.
67
 In the fall of 1992 UNPROFOR was additionally mandated with monitoring 
the full withdrawal of JNA from Croatian territory.
68
 
By January 1993 the desperation of the UN grew as the actors persistently failed to 
comply with ceasefire agreements and the international law, and the language of the 
resolutions became much sharper and more impatient with the waring armed forces in 
Croatia.
69
 The word ‘demands’ took over the previous ‘calls’ and ‘invites’.70 Change in the 
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lexicon of the UN happened after the Croatian Army attacks on protected areas which resulted 
in several UNPROFOR soldiers losing their lives, and the theft of weapons and military 
equipment belonging to UNPROFOR, which the only actor who was still able to legally 
obtain weapons on the Croatian territory due to the weapons embargo.
71
  
In march of 1995 the UN established ‘United Nations Confidence Restoration 
Operation in Croatia’ (UNCRO), a special operation with the main mandate of implementing 
existing UN Security Council resolutions and ceasefire agreements, and providing safe 
crossing of humanitarian aid to the territory of neighboring Bosnia, which was at this point 
also in the midst of a war.
72
 UNCRO was supported by the existing UN Member States armed 
forces in Croatia, which were now mandated with protecting UNCRO personnel.
73
 According 
to the UNSC, this mandate has been successfully achieved.
74
 After peace was achieved in 
Croatia, the UN continued its presence under UNCRO, and another year long operation called 
‘United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western 
Sirmium’ (UNTAES).75 This operation was launched in order to complete peaceful rejoining 
of Croatia’s eastern regions that were a part of the RSK since the beginning of the war.76 
Main objectives of the operation were to maintain peace, demilitarize the region, and 
guarantee safe return of displaced persons.
77
 
 As mentioned above, UNPROFOR and the UN had positive connotation with many 
civilians living in protected zones. For example, my family had no running water for 6 months 
until a Danish battalion provided resources and manpower needed to get water plants 
operational again. However, there were several major incidents that left international 
community doubting that the deployment of UNPROFOR was a good move. One of these 
incidents happened in my hometown, Dvor, the same place UNPROFOR brought food and 
running water to. A massacre of disabled persons happened at extremely close proximity to a 
Danish base and the UN soldiers did nothing to stop or prevent it, with a justification that it 
was not their mandate.
78
 Yet even though this was undoubtedly a horrific event, in the eyes of 
international community it is forgettable in comparison to UNPROFOR fiasco in Bosnia. 
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3.2.2 NATO  
NATO was not a major player in Croatian conflict due to several distractions it faced at the 
time the conflict was playing out. In one of the first statement issued on the topic of crisis in 
Yugoslavia, NATO expressed support for EU as the main mediator in the conflict, thereby 
simultaneously shifting the responsibility for the peacekeeping away from themselves.
79
 
NATO furthermore called for a cease of violence, underlining that it will not recognize 
change of the Yugoslav borders that were achieved using violent measures.
80
 Later on, NATO 
explicitly reaffirmed its supportive role in Yugoslavia, naming the UN as the lead actor 
chosen by the international community.
81
 
 Attacks, in form of airstrikes, were performed on Serb forces on Croatian territory by 
NATO, but only in order to protect safe areas in Bosnia.
82
 In 1994 NATO was authorized by 
the UN Security Council to use air force in Bosnia if necessary to protect safe areas.
83
 In the 
decision made by NATO in November of 1994 they interpreted this authorization to extend to 
Croatian territory if necessary for the original objective, since a number of Serb attacks on 
Bosnia were performed from RSK, which was in Croatian territory.
84
 Croatia and NATO 
relations have come a long way since the war, and Croatia, as well as Slovenia, are currently 
the only former Yugoslav republics to become fully fledged members of NATO.
85
  
 
3.2.3 European Community/Union 
European Community (from here on EU) was the first international actor to get involved in 
the breakup of Yugoslavia when they peacefully intervened in Slovenian conflict in 1991, 
resulting in Brioni declaration.
86
 The EU had dispatched a Ministerial Troika, non-military 
mission aimed at providing conditions for peace talks between parties involved in the 
conflict.
87
 EU has promised to pursue a peaceful solution to problems arising in Yugoslavia, 
and urged actors to abstain from further use of violence in the process of breakup of 
Yugoslavia.
88
 As a result of violence in Slovenia, the EU launched an unarmed monitoring 
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mission called ‘multinational Observer Mission to Yugoslavia’ (ECMM), which also included 
monitoring in Croatia.
89
 The EU had also imposed sanctions on Yugoslavia that consisted of a 
weapons embargo and suspension of aid to Yugoslav government.
90
 
 As the violence nevertheless continued and more republics of Yugoslavia sought 
independence, the EU created the Badinter Commission, an arbitration Commission tasked 
with publishing legal opinion on disintegration of Yugoslavia.
91
 Opinions issued by the 
Commission were not legally binding to any party, although they contained legal 
interpretations compatible with international law.
92
 Most notable opinion published was the 
one ruling that the union of Serbia and Montenegro, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, should 
not be de facto legal successor of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but that all of the 
former republic should assume this role.
93
 However, since Badinter Commission opinions 
were not legally binding, actors didn’t feel like they needed to listen, which led to Member 
States double standards in recognizing sovereignty of some Yugoslav republics and not of the 
others.
94
 EU Member States jumped to recognize sovereignty of some Yugoslav republic, 
with German chancellor at the time, Helmut Kohl, being the leading politician behind this 
movement.
95
 Many consider this move to be one of the important factors in accelerating the 
raise of national tensions in the region, because it was seen by Serbian leaders as a treat to 
their position in former Yugoslavia.
96
 
 When the actual fighting commenced in Croatia, structural shortcomings of EU’s 
abilities to maintain peace in its immediate neighborhood soon became apparent. The EU 
tried persuading the actors to seek a peaceful solution by using economic tools, which was all 
it had at its disposal at the time.
97
 Needless to say, economic incentive was not enough to stop 
nationalistic tensions that have been brewing for over a decade, especially considering the 
divide in opinion between most powerful EU Member States on the issue.
98
 Assertion of 
Germany as the main influence in the Western Balkans, and its clear siding with Croatia and 
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Slovenia had pushed Serbia even further into aggression.
99
 However, when the push came to 
shove, Germany, as well as the EC as a whole, opted out of military intervention and sought 
peaceful diplomatic solution.
100
 This has led to the increased involvement of the UN, which 
took over as the main international actor.
101
 Furthermore, the EU did not follow through on all 
the threats it made, possibly since it lacked any form of enforcement. For example, EU 
threatened to impose negative measures on Croatia in case they launch offensive on Krajina, 
yet after Croatia did just that in operation Storm there were no repercussions.  
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4. Bosnia 
4.1 Background 
Just like in Slovenia and Croatia before it, an independence referendum was held in Bosnia. 
The pro-independence side had won this referendum with an overwhelming majority of 99.7 
percent.
102
 Yet unlike the other two former Yugoslav republics, its independence was not 
swiftly recognized by the EU.
103
 Bosnian Serbs did not want Bosnian independence from 
Yugoslavia, and have thus boycotted and then rejected the referendum, and as a response to it 
performed a swift territory grab of Serbian majority areas.
104
 Bosnian Croats did the same 
with their majority territory.
105
 Bosnian Serbs joined Krajina Serbs in combat, and Croatian 
government joined the government of Bosnia and Croat part of Bosnia.
106
 Conflict broke out 
in spring of 1992 and it became the bloodiest war on European soil after WWII, resulting in 
many dead and millions displaced.
107
  
In April of 1992 Bosnia’s capital city at the time, Sarajevo, was besieged by Bosnian 
Serb army.
108
 This was not the only siege of an important city in the Yugoslav wars, since 
Dubrovnik in Croatia has been besieged prior to 
Sarajevo.
109
 However, it was the longest siege 
not only in Yugoslavia, but of any city in the 
modern history, lasting even longer than the 
siege of Leningrad.
110
 The city was deprived of 
steady supplies of food and water, and 
constantly terrorized by sniping attacks on 
civilians.
111
 Sniping attacks on civilians 
happened everywhere in the city, and targets 
were not only the people in the open areas, but also in the public transport.
112
 Snipers used 
sniper rifles on individuals, and rocket launchers in order to maximalise damage in large 
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groups.
113
 In 1995 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps (SRK), a division of the Bosnian Serb army, 
commenced attacks with modified air bombs that for many citizens caused even more terror 
than the sniping.
114
 A day in besieged Sarajevo was a survival lottery. In late 1995 NATO 
airstrikes helped break the siege, with the remainder of Bosnian Serb forces and the 
peacekeepers withdrawing from the city in January 1996.
115
 
 Most notable failure of the international community in Bosnia happened in July of 
1995 when the Bosnian-Serb forces took over Dutch guarded UNPROFOR safe area in 
Srebrenica, East Bosnia, and massacred Muslim population of this enclave.
116
 ICTY ruled this 
attack genocide, and placed the number of dead between seven and eight thousand Muslim 
man.
117
 However tragic, this event did bring about the end of the war because it finally made 
the US take an interest and begin actively seeking out conflict resolution.
118
 A few months 
later, war came to an end. 
War in Bosnia officially ended on 21
st
 of November 1995 when General Framework 
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, better known as Dayton treaty, was signed 
in Paris by the representatives of Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian government, witnessed by US, 
EU, Russia, UK, France and Germany.
119
 Solution to the ethnic question of this treaty was 
dividing Bosnia into two entities, Serb majority Republic of Srpska and Bosniak and Croat 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
120
 Annex four of Dayton accords serves as the 
country’s constitution.121 As a result of all the compromises made in Dayton, Bosnia is quite 
weak as a state, and it still relies heavily on international community to implement Dayton 
and fulfill its duties as a state, especially in areas of security and justice.
122
 
Number of displaced persons after the Bosnian war was of immense proportions. 
Around 2.5 million people, which is over half of the entire prewar population of Bosnia was 
displaced, majority of which were displaced outside Bosnian territory.
123
 ICTY places the 
number of dead at an estimated 100.000.
124
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4.2 International Actors 
4.2.1 United Nations 
The UN was the leading international actor in Bosnian conflict. It first got involved in 
Bosnian war in May of 1992 when the Security Council issued resolution 752 stating their 
concern with the quick and violent outbreak of conflict in Bosnia.
125
 Only two weeks later 
they took first action, instituting a no fly zone over Bosnian territory.
126
 Since the UN was 
already active in Croatia at the time conflict spilled over to Bosnia, Security Council was able 
to take immediate action. UNPROFOR was deployed only a month after the conflict’s 
outbreak, labeling it as a territorial extension of their original mandate in Croatia.
127
 UN 
established six safe areas on Bosnian territory and mandated UNPROFOR with monitoring 
implementation of ceasefire agreements in and around these areas and providing humanitarian 
aid and security to the civilians therein.
128
 However, this mandate was exceedingly difficult to 
fulfil due to constant breaches of safe area related agreements by both warring parties.
129
 
UN had an important role in besieged Sarajevo during the shelling by Bosnian Serb 
forces, where it assured passage of humanitarian help together with NATO so that the 
population of the city does not starve.
130
 However, they alone were unable to lift the siege, 
and UNPROFOR personnel was systematically targeted by the snipers as well.
131
 
UNPROFOR troops were further mandated with protecting United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) convoys carrying humanitarian aid to war affected 
parts of Bosnia.
132
 
Protecting Croatian safe zones was already extremely difficult because of the high 
ethnic tensions between the Serbs and Croats. In Bosnia there were three ethnicities in conflict, 
which made the peacekeeping graduate from extremely difficult to impossible. During 
UNPROFOR’s time in Bosnia several incidents took place in and around UN safe areas, the 
most atrocious one being the massacre of Muslim man in Srebrenica following failure to 
demilitarize this enclave. One of the tasks of Dutch battalion of UNPROFOR was to 
demilitarize Bosnian Muslim fighters in Srebrenica, which they failed to do as the fighters, 
under the command of Naser Oric, massacred Serbian civilians in the villages around the 
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enclave.
133
 According to the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation this failure is one 
of the main reasons Serbian forces retaliated by committing genocide in Srebrenica.
134
 
Between seven and eight thousand Muslim boys and man were killed in a matter of one week, 
in what the ICTY named ‘the single worst atrocity committed in the former Yugoslavia 
during the wars of the 1990s and the worst massacre that occurred in Europe since the months 
after World War II’.135 This massacre being ruled genocide by the ICTY is believed to have 
truly helped to quicken the international community response to conflict in the future.
136
 
 UN was the main peacekeeper in Bosnia, however, due to limited capabilities of 
UNPROFOR it relied on NATO for fulfilling certain Security Council resolutions objectives, 
namely the no fly zone.
137
 After the signing of Dayton treaty, UNPROFOR was replaced as 
the main peacekeeping force in Bosnia by NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR). 138 
However, UN too remained present in the country, International Police Task Force (IPTF) 
which later became launching United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(UNMBIH).
139
 IPFT was originally mandated with fulfilling policing tasks in Bosnia after the 
war, and was later replaced by EU led missions.
140
 To implement civilian aspects of Dayton, 
the UN created a position High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace 
Agreement (HR).
141
 Office of the High Representative is still active today.
142
 
The UN was not only trying to prevent atrocities from taking place, but also to 
prosecute the ones responsible for the crimes against humanity that have already happened 
and kept on happening. As a response to the violence, ethnic cleansing and consistent breach 
of international law in both Bosnia and Croatia, Security Council adopted resolution 808 in 
May of 1993 forming International Criminal Court for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which is 
still operational to this day.
143
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4.2.2 NATO  
NATO’s involvement in Yugoslav wars truly began in Bosnia. In fact, the times NATO was 
present in Croatia were primarily related to Bosnian conflict, and not Croatian one.
144
 Before 
getting military involved NATO acted in non-military terms, instituting an arms embargo on 
former Yugoslavia in 1992.
145
 NATO commenced its military involvement in 1993, originally 
tasked with monitoring the no-fly zone that was earlier established in the UN resolution 
781.
146
 This initial task turned into operation Deny Flight which had NATO enforce the no-fly 
zone until the end of the war.
147
 
NATO’s main role in the conflict was one of supporting UNPROFOR protected areas 
through performing air strikes.
148
 In August of 1993 NATO Council decided to commence 
initial air strikes on Bosnia in relation to sieged Sarajevo, yet specified this action as not being 
military involvement since it served solely to protect humanitarian assistance.
149
 The official 
reason stated by the UN was Bosnian Serb forces failure to return heavy weaponry that they 
have earlier stolen from UNPROFOR.
150
 During the course of the war more air strikes were 
performed as a part of the agreement between NATO and UNPROFOR, due to the escalation 
on the situation on ground.
151
 One of the reasons for air strikes was to protect UNPROFOR 
safe areas in November of 1994.
152
 After the fall of Srebrenica in 1995 NATO became a much 
more involved actor in the conflict, increasing the rate of air strikes performed.
153
 The most 
important joint effort of UN and NATO was ending the Siege of Sarajevo.
154
  
 After the signing of the Dayton treaty, UN passed resolution 2035 mandating NATO 
to deploy troops to oversee its implementation.
155
 IFOR replaced all of the UNPROFOR 
troops, thereby becoming the main peacekeeper in post-conflict Bosnia.
156
 NATO IFOR was 
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later replaced by Stabilization Force (SFOR) mandated with maintaining peace and 
overseeing implementation of the military aspects of Dayton.
157
  
 
4.2.3 European Community/Union 
Just like in case of Croatia, the EU was the first one on the scene when the war violently 
broke out in Bosnia. Violence commenced quickly and ECMM member was amongst the first 
casualties
158
. In resolution 752 (1992), UN Security Council praises efforts done by the 
ECMM to find a resolution to the Bosnian issue. In the words of NATO spokesman, conflict 
in Yugoslavia was in Europe’s backyard, and it was EU’s responsibility.159 NATO has hoped 
to see Europe maintain peace in its own neighborhood without relying on the help from 
NATO.
160
 However, although the EU came up with peace solutions, without the means to 
implement them its notable efforts consisted mainly of providing humanitarian aid.
161
 In order 
to be able to provide the aid to affected areas, European Community Humanitarian Office 
created European Community Task Force in 1992.
162
 It provided not only food and medicine, 
but also aid in psychological and social issues.
163
 
 Eruption of Bosnian conflict, and the background of perceived failure to act in 
Croatian, one pushed the newly formed EU to equip itself with the means to respond to this 
crisis, and the ones like it in the future. Unarmed monitoring Mission may have been the way 
after the Slovenian conflict, yet as the situation escalated a member of the mission lost their 
life in the aggression.
164
 A new Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was adopted in 
1993, naming inability to act in Yugoslav conflicts as the first and foremost reason for the 
necessity of this legislation.
165
 Uncoordinated reactions of the Member States are also 
mentioned as a reason for necessity of this legislation, which is likely referring to Member 
State hypocrisy in recognition of Former Yugoslav republic sovereignty.
166
 German led 
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rushed recognition of Croat and Slovene independence did not translate to Bosnia, as the 
chancellor Kohl delayed recognition of independence declaration of Bosnia.
167
  
 The EU became the main military actor in Bosnia in the years after the war, when the 
EU military forces replaced NATO as the security provider in the country.
168
Two missions 
were launched under the new European Defense and Security Policy (EDSP), European 
Union Police Mission (EUPM) in 2002 and EUFOR Althea 2004.
169
 Missions were mandated 
with assuring implementation of security parts of Dayton and supporting Bosnian police and 
army. Their mandates were so similar that it initially caused disagreements about the task of 
each of the missions. EUPM initial duration was three years, however, the mandate was only 
fulfilled in 2009.
170
 EUFOR Althea is still ongoing, although since the security situation has 
improved from the beginning of the mission, the number of EU troops in Bosnia decreased 
significantly.
171
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5. Kosovo 
5.1 Background 
Kosovo war was a yearlong armed conflict in Albanian majority Kosovo region of south 
Serbia starting in 1998.
172
 The initial conflict was fought between Serbian armed forces under 
the command of president Milošević and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) which was 
comprised of ethnic Albanians.
173
 In 1999 NATO joined the conflict, siding against the 
Serbian forces.
174
 
 Prior to 1990’s Kosovo region enjoyed high level of autonomy in former Yugoslavia, 
with some of its autonomous right being ability to choose their own official language, police 
and economic policy.
175
 After the breakup of Yugoslavia, Serbian president Milošević 
attempted to withdraw Kosovo’s constitutional rights in order to make the region less 
Albanian, as a part of his quest for an ethnically clean Serbia.
176
 Constitutional right of 
Kosovar Albanians ceased to exist overnight as they were prohibited from using their 
language, printing their newspapers and other media in Albanian.
177
 They were also massively 
laid off from important positions, such as teachers and policeman. 
178
 In response to long 
lasting oppression, Kosovar Albanians formed guerrilla forces that became known as the 
KLA.
179
  
War was devastating from the very start, and the humanitarian crises escalated 
extremely quickly. Over a quarter million persons were displaced within the first six months 
of the conflict.
180
 It took less than six months after that, by May of 1999, for the number of 
displaced persons to reach the immense number of 800.000.
181
 
 The war was effectively ended by Military Technical Agreement, better known as 
Kumanovo agreement, which followed after a NATO bombing campaign of Serbia lasting 
over two months.
182
 NATO took over the responsibility for peace maintaining in Kosovo after 
the end of the conflict, and still continues to fulfil this role today.
183
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 Kosovo did not declare its independence from Serbia until ten years after the onset of 
the conflict. Even Montenegro, a country that formed Yugoslavia together with Serbia after 
the initial breakup of Socialist Yugoslavia, separated from Serbia before Kosovo did. This 
contrast is quite shocking since Serbia and Montenegro have very friendly relations and have 
never been in armed conflict with each other.
184
 Although Kosovo declaration of 
independence is considered legal under international law according to the International Court 
of Justice advisory opinion in 2010, it is still not recognised by all UN Member States.
185
 
 
5.2 International Actors 
5.2.1 United Nations 
UN first expressed concern about escalating tensions in Kosovo in March of 1998.
186
 In the 
first resolution concerning aggression in Kosovo, Security Council called upon Serbian and 
Albanian armed forces to settle their disputes in a peaceful manner, and also instituted a 
weapons and military equipment embargo on both parties in hope of reaching this 
objective.
187
 Security Council also requested for humanitarian organisations to be allowed 
safe access to the region, and for the ICTY prosecutor to begin collecting relevant data on the 
aggression.
188
 By the fall of the same year situation deteriorated quickly, and the UN 
estimated 230.000 persons to be displaced in the neighbouring countries and in Europe, 
labelling humanitarian situation near catastrophic.
189
 As a response, Kosovo Diplomatic 
Observer Mission was established in resolution 1199.
190
 This was a mission executed by a 
team of diplomats with a goal of collecting intelligence on the ground situation in Kosovo.
191
 
 In its involvement, the UN did not advocate independence of Kosovo from the federal 
government, emphasizing that whatever the solution to the conflict it should respect Serbia’s 
internal borders. 
192
 UN’s comprehensive plan for achieving a peaceful solution to this, is laid 
down in Rambouillet Accords in June 1999.
193
 This agreement emphasises individual’s rights 
of all peoples of Kosovo regardless of their ethnicity, such as their right to return to their 
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homes, as well as the right to self-governing of the province.
194
 It envisages Kosovo as a part 
of Serbia, but with its own institutions.
195
 Even though it was regarded as favourable to 
Kosovar Albanians, KLA was not satisfied with this agreement because it laid down 
mandatory demilitarisation of KLA and denied Kosovo full independence.
196
 Ramboullet 
agreement failed to satisfy either warring side, and it was rejected by both Milošević and 
KLA.
197
  
 UN was not favourable to KLA, which it considered a terrorist organisation and it 
repeatedly referred to their doings as ‘terrorist action’.198 In documents relating to the UN 
solutions to the Kosovo conflict, resolution 1244 and Ramboullet agreement, the UN calls for 
demilitarisation of the KLA.
199
 
 UN was only able to exert more influence over the fate of Kosovo after the NATO 
bombing campaign made Serbian government stop the aggression. Resolution 1244 of 1999 
that set out post-war arrangements for the region was adopted shortly after the strikes ended, 
and it is the most important UN document regarding Kosovo. United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and NATO peace maintaining mission both 
authorized this resolution.
200
  
UNMIK is a UN mission mandated with running the newly autonomous, but not yet 
independent Kosovo region after the conflict. UNMIK was relieved in part by EURLEX 
Kosovo, which took over several policy areas after Kosovo declared independence.
201
 
 
5.2.2 NATO  
NATO is the international actor with the most important role in the Kosovo war since its role 
was not only an observer or a peacekeeper, but one of the belligerents. After the initial 
conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia they participated in bringing stability to Kosovo in 1996, 
hoping to prevent the conflict in the region.
202
 However, their optimism on the success of this 
operation was struck down shortly after, when the violence commenced. NATO got involved 
in the conflict in October of 1998, when it issued an activation order for an air campaign on 
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Yugoslav territory, because Serbia was not respecting UN Security Council resolutions.
203
 
NATO Secretary General stressed that this order was not a war declaration, and he was still 
sure that a diplomatic solution can be found, which later proved not to be the case.
204
 In the 
beginning of this conflict NATO again stressed the same point they have been making since 
the beginning of the end of Yugoslavia - Europe needs to take responsibility for its own 
defence.
205
 Furthermore, NATO stressed that lack of institutional capabilities cannot form an 
excuse not to take action.
206
 
Large scale air strike mission was commenced in April of 1999 and the objectives for 
it were set out in an extraordinary meeting in Brussels at foreign ministers level.
207
 Reasoning 
for involvement was clear: Serbia’s continuous disrespect for UN Security Council 
resolutions.
208
 The humanitarian crisis reached the 
tipping point and the risk of conflict spill over to 
Albania and Macedonia, as seen before with Croatia 
and Bosnia, was a viable risk. Therefore, NATO 
considered military involvement to be a correct 
response to the situation.
209
 Military action in the form 
of air strikes was aimed against Serbian president 
Slobodan Milošević, as he was seen as the one 
responsible for the situation getting extremely out of hand.
210
 Requests for ending NATO air 
strikes were as follows: 
 
“Milošević knows what he has to do. He must: ensure a verifiable stop to all military action 
and the immediate ending of violence and repression; ensure the withdrawal from Kosovo of 
the military, police and paramilitary forces; agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an 
international military presence; agree to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and 
displaced persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organisations; provide 
credible assurance of his willingness to work on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords in the 
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establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo in conformity with international 
law and the Charter of the United Nations.”211 
 
 The air strikes lasted for 77 days and the operation was officially named Operation 
Allied Force, although civilians suffering under the strikes refer to it as the Operation 
Merciful Angel.
212
 They ended as the government of Serbia agreed to the conditions set out 
by NATO, and the terms of Serbian withdrawal from Kosovo were laid out in the Military 
Technical Agreement.
213
 In words of Oxford professor Adam Roberts, what makes Operation 
Allied force unique is even though the reason behind the bombing campaign was disobeying 
the UN Security Council resolution, the Security Council itself never officially approved the 
strikes.
214
 NATO Secretary General attributed the success in Kosovo to swift intervention, 
which was the correction of the path of non-involvement in former Yugoslavia from the early 
1990’s.215  After the initial triumph, NATO commenced peace maintaining mission under 
Kosovo Force (KFOR), with a mandate similar to previously established SFOR mission in 
Bosnia.
216
 This mission was authorised by the UN in the resolution 1244 and it is ongoing to 
this date.
217
 
 
5.3.3 European Union  
European defence was constantly on the table in the years around Kosovo war.
218
 In the short 
period at the turn of the millennium it seemed like the there was much enthusiasm towards 
creating a Europe that was capable of own defence.
219
 A series of conferences were held on 
this topic, one first being just a few months after the conflict outbreak, in October 1998 at 
Pörtschac.
220
 Discussion was led by UK Prime Minister at the time, Tony Blair, who was a 
big advocate for Europe that is capable of standing alone in the face of conflict without 
needing to rely so heavily on the US.
221
 Blair made a statement at the conference that Europe 
is already able to carry out a peacekeeping mission, however, even though a conflict in need 
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of peacekeeping was happening just an hour flight from where the summit took place, the EU 
never did deploy such mission to Kosovo.
222
  
 Even though the EU was unable to organise a peacekeeping mission under its 
umbrella, EU Member States did participate in the conflict. NATO led an all-European 
extraction mission in Kosovo in 1998 to prove a point that European troops are very capable 
of conflict intervention.
223
  
 After the Kosovo conflict had been resolved the European Council held a meeting 
defining objectives for the future of EU’s military capabilities.224 Main goal for the area of 
security and defence was the capability to carry out military missions under the lead of EU, 
which do not rely on the NATO involvement.
225
 The constant emphasis on the wish to be 
capable to intervene without relying on NATO truly showcases the fatigue of the EU after the 
failure to end a conflict for the third time in a decade.   
EU’s post-conflict presence in the Western Balkans countries after the war truly 
evolved from early 1990s to today. While they retained no significant presence in Croatia and 
provided justice, and home affair support in Bosnia, the EU took over quite essential duties of 
a state in Kosovo. In 2008, the EU launched EULEX Kosovo, a mission to support rule of law 
in a newly unilaterally independent republic.
226
 EU further expanded its presence in Kosovo 
with the establishment of EU Office in Kosovo, a body designed to help Kosovo fulfil their 
EU agenda.
227
 EU took over these tasks from the UN as Kosovo declared independence since 
the UN choose to remain neutral in the matter since not all of its Member States recognised 
Kosovar Independence. Interestingly enough, even though the EU is evidently not assuming 
the same neutral stance as it has become international actor most vocal about EU 
independence, to this day there are still five EU Member States that do not recognise 
Kosovo.
228
 This paradox is the most notable in the fact that Kosovo is listed as a potential EU 
candidate, and on its road to visa free travel to the EU, despite not even being seen as a 
country by all Member States.
229
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6. Discussion   
As evident from previous chapters, the EU was undeniably one of the main international 
actors involved in resolution of Yugoslav conflicts. This chapter argues that if the EU used 
other means to aid the former Yugoslav republics in ceasing violence, the conflicts would 
have played out differently. Initial reaction of the EU to the conflicts will kick off the 
discussion, followed by shortcomings of EU’s approach and alternatives to it that would have 
been more suitable for conflict resolution. Finally, I will discuss EU’s presence in former 
Yugoslav Republics after the war, as it is important in the context of EU’s military 
capabilities. These points of discussion are chosen as the most suitable in order to analyse 
mistakes the EU made, and continues to make, in the area of international conflict resolution. 
Discussing these mistakes will serve to come to a conclusion on how the EU can improve in 
this field and act more suitably in the future. 
 
6.1 EU reaction to the conflicts  
The behavior of the EU as an actor in Yugoslav wars was not always in proportion to the 
gravity of the situation. Looking at these conflicts with the hindsight knowledge, it becomes 
apparent that the actorness of the EU made a big impact on how it played out. Although the 
main focus of this research is what the EU did not do, in terms of its military capabilities, the 
discussion will begin with what the actions EU did undertake that proved not to be optimal for 
conflict solution. 
The EU’s initial reaction to the wars was very swift and fully diplomatic. When armed 
conflict commenced in Slovenia EU was first on the scene to recognize the country’s 
independence, draft a peace plan and launch a monitoring mission. However, EU leaders were 
not aware of the fact that their job was not done, but only just beginning. Perhaps it was 
because the almost immediate end of violence in Slovenia that the conflict of colossal 
proportions in Croatia and its spillover to the neighboring countries was not anticipated by 
anyone. Neither Yugoslavian officials and citizens, nor the international community saw it 
coming. Only a year before the violence and destruction commenced, the permanent 
representative of Yugoslavia to the UN sent an official letter to Nelson Mandela 
congratulating South Africa on triumph over apartheid and promising the support of 
Yugoslavia and her people in their democratization process.
230
 This goes to show how 
oblivious even the high ranking officials within the Yugoslav state were to the fact that that 
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was the last full year of Yugoslavia. When the actual large scale conflict commenced the EU 
was taken by surprise, and scrambled to respond in time. The ability to dedicate full attention 
to Croatian conflict was further hindered by the fact that there was so much going on in the 
world at the time, such as the war in Iraq, instability in the Soviet Union and imminent fall of 
Communism.
231
 Although the EU tried to take control of assuring security in its immediate 
neighborhood, it was unable to significantly affect the course of action. Whether it’s because 
of infrastructural limitations, distractions or internal divide, it failed to prove itself as an 
important factor in Croatian war. The rest of the international community originally expected 
the EU to solve the issues in the Western Balkans, which led to a significant delay in other 
organizations involvement in the conflict. 
The faith that other international actors, for one reason or another, placed on EU to 
solve Yugoslav conflicts undoubtedly served to slow down appropriate reaction at the 
beginning of the wars. But what exactly caused this reaction? There is no single reason that 
one can pinpoint, but a whole collection of misjudgements and a massive underestimation of 
the situation. Yes, neither the EU not the rest of the international community expected for 
Yugoslavia to break up abruptly and violently in an ethnic conflict of such proportions. Yes, 
nobody expected initial conflict to spill over and cause an even bigger conflict. Also, none of 
the actors knew at the time that the wars are going to drag out over the duration of the entire 
decade. However, relying on an organisation that at the time had no common military, 
defence policy nor even a common position to take a lead in solving an international conflict 
was extremely short-sighted. What makes this bad decision worse, is that this short-sighted 
approach was taken again in Bosnia. 
Failure to swiftly act in Bosnia truly was a mistake that is hard to find excuses for. In 
the case of Croatia the situation was new and not fully comprehendible. The EU was caught 
by surprise and not decided on whether the federal government or the separatists were the bad 
guy, and conflict spread faster than anyone anticipated. Therefore lack of action can be 
attributed to these factors, as well as institutional shortcomings. However, once the conflict 
spilled over to Bosnia it was obvious that diplomacy, embargos and declarations was not 
getting anyone far, fast. Bosnia truly resembled a small-scale WWII. Millions were displaced, 
hundred thousand died, a major city was under siege and the most heinous war crimes were 
committed, culminating in genocide. If there was a conflict that could have persuaded 
                                                            
231 Woodward 1995, p. 177 
Tina Hofland s1364847 MAEUS 
 
35 
 
European leaders to act as a hard power it was this one, yet the EU again resorted to 
diplomatic means. 
After failing to have a proper reaction to Croatian and Bosnian war EU did make 
promises that it will not stand by and watch another conflict unravel again, and the common 
defence euphoria was at full swing. The promises made in 1995 of how another Bosnia will 
not happen again were eventually kept only by NATO. The EU has adopted the CFSP after 
failure in Croatia and an even bigger failure in Bosnia, yet it was not put to use in Kosovo. It 
is likely because the CFSP was drafted after peace has been achieved, but while the horrors of 
the war were still fresh in everyone’s mind. The Member States managed to agree on the fact 
that more than trade sanctions were necessary for achieving results in international politics, 
yet the original CFSP remains vague and full of empty promises. It is easy in the times of 
peace to agree that next time a conflict breaks out a common response will be coordinated and 
swift. In reality, next time a conflict did happen response was anything but, reaffirmed by the 
fact that even to this day EU Member States do not unanimously recognise Kosovo. For the 
third time in one decade EU was shocked by the violence yet failed to put in enough effort to 
contain it.  
There are some other factors that may explain the utterly disappointing reaction to 
Kosovo war. It is possible that the time gap between the conflicts lured actors into a false 
sense of stability in the Balkans. The question of independence may also be the underlining 
reason for lack of action. Kosovo conflict was different than Croatia or Bosnia because it did 
not start after a declaration of independence. In fact, declaration of independence came a good 
decade after the conflict ended. Getting involved in armed conflict on the soil of a sovereign 
nation is not always easy for governments to justify to their people. Add to that the issue of 
clarity in Kosovo: who was fighting, who were the good and who were the bad guys and what 
are they fighting for, and getting involved quickly becomes a logistic nightmare.  
However, Kosovo was the prime time for the EU to show its conflict intervention 
capabilities, and out of the three conflicts presents the biggest missed opportunity to do so. 
Especially since there was a gap left by the UN that EU could have filled. UN was not a key 
actor in Kosovo during the conflict nearly as much as in was Croatia or Bosnia. It did not get 
physically involved, whether it was because of the fatigue from peacekeeping in the rest of 
Yugoslavia, or the blurred lines of who the aggressor actually is. UN was by no means 
friendly with Serbian government but it did, after all, consider KLA a terrorist organisation. 
UNPROFOR was never deployed, even though Kosovo humanitarian crises left a higher 
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number of displaced persons than a much longer Croatian conflict. Even the diplomatic 
actions undertaken by the UN were not satisfactory. The Security Council spent time and 
resources coming up with Security Council resolutions that read so similarly that one needs to 
repeatedly check the date and number in order to make sure they are indeed not re-reading the 
same document time and again. Furthermore, UN drafted a complex, 86 page long 
Ramboullet agreement without realising how incompatible it is with goals that the warring 
sides wanted to achieve as a result of the conflict. It was not until after NATO Operation 
Allied Force made Milošević surrender that the UN passed a significant resolution. The EU 
did take over diplomatic and military UN missions in both Bosnia and Kosovo after the war, 
but unfortunately failed to do so during. 
 
6.2 Shortcomings of diplomacy only approach  
EU’s approach to the wars was as bureaucratic as it can get. A good testament to that is a 
regulation from 1992, a year conflict spilled over to Bosnia and the severity of the situation 
became more clear than ever. While ethnic conflicts raged in the Balkans, EU focused on 
trade, passing legislation regulating import of fresh sour cherries.
232
 However, at the time it 
was the only approach within their means. What if the EU had a military? Could it have made 
a change? Evidence shows that that is likely the case. The UN took a while to deploy 
UNPROFOR and even when it did, UNPROFOR had a limited mandate. As seen from the 
massacre in Dvor, UNPROFOR battalions had a very narrow interpretation of their mandate, 
and some of them were not willing to overstep it even to save human lives. What these 
conflicts truly needed, was an intervention.  
Furthermore, UNPROFOR peacekeeping failed in providing security in several 
instances, one of the main reasons being that they were comically understaffed for such a 
serious peacekeeping operation. The EU was, however, able to deploy quite significant 
number of soldiers in both EUFOR Althea and EUPM missions in Bosnia just several years 
after the initial two conflicts ended. These two missions alone counted over 7500 military 
personnel, while the entire strength of UNPROFOR in both Croatia and Bosnia was around 
35000.
233
 Although there was most likely some overlap in military personnel in EU missions 
and UNPROFOR, it is safe to say that UNPROFOR would have benefited from extra 
numbers. For example, one of the main reason Dutchbat III was unable to defend Srebrenica 
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was because of their numbers. It was even called the most vulnerable UNPROFOR battalion 
by Bill Clinton.
234
 If the EU was able to support UNPROFOR back in 1995 they may have 
had a fighting chance in Srebrenica. Of course the question of the mandate still remains. As 
seen from Dvor massacre, even when numbers were not an issue UNPROFOR failed to act 
because it was not in their mandate. Having had troops on ground in and around UNPROFOR 
safe areas that had a mandate more comparable to that of NATO in Kosovo, combined with 
the good numbers, would have been a more suitable way for the international community to 
pursue the resolution of Bosnian conflict. There was no actor of this description present in 
Bosnia, making it a gap that EU could have filled had the Member States leaders agreed on 
transferring some sovereignty in this policy area to supranational level.  
Furthermore, the fact that EU had no means of enforcement of its peace plans meant 
that it could only make empty threats and the warring sides were seemingly aware of this. For 
example, during the Croatian conflict Croatian forces did manage to take back the territory 
that was occupied by Serbs, but it was at cost of hundreds of thousands families displaced 
from their homes, many never to return. This radical exodus came as a result of a quarter of 
Croatia’s territory being occupied by Serbian minority for years, since shortly after the 
declaration of independence. Nationalistic sentiment that brought about this event continues 
to this day, and it is nowadays seen Croatian relation to Serbia and to the ICTY. Because 
Croatia felt like it was in the right in the conflict, it refused to cooperate in extraditing 
potential war criminals to the ICTY because they were considered war heroes.
235
 
Furthermore, the EU threatened Croatia that there will be consequences if they went through 
with operation Storm, but there was no way for the EU to deliver on this threat and Croatian 
leaders did not face any consequences for this action. It could be argued that had the EU 
intervened in ending the conflict early on, it would not only immediately help save human 
lives and property, but also not allowing for the relations between the countries to deteriorate 
so deeply that it is still an issue today. Hostilities between countries after a conflict are not 
uncommon, however, Serbia and Croatia did reconcile quickly after the Second World War 
although they were on opposing sides, not much unlike France and Germany did.
236
  
The diplomatic approach of the EU was, to some degree, directly caused by its lack of 
military capabilities. Since the military intervention was off the table at the onset, the EU saw 
conflicts differently than an actor with strong military would. Furthermore, the EU had to 
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think about its image, and according to theory as a predominantly soft power the EU must 
retain a level of morality, culture and attraction in order to be able to influence the actions of 
others. On the other hand, NATO and the US are freer to make seemingly unpopular decisions 
because they are military strong. The truth is that large scale airstrikes like the one performed 
during the Operation Allied Force are not popular, nor are they always effective. Yet when 
humanitarian crises gets as out of hand, as it did in Bosnia, they should at least be considered 
as an option. The main moral dilemma behind this kind of attacks is whether it’s justifiable to 
kill a few to potentially save many. In the case of Bosnia ultimately it wasn’t. However, 
NATO later came to regret this decision and decide that yes, it was justifiable when Kosovo 
conflict broke out. The unpopularity of violent conflict intervention may be another reason 
why EU missed its opportunity in Bosnia. Therefore, if the EU wishes to retain its soft, 
normative power appeal, questionable conflict involvement is a luxury it cannot afford. And, 
as mentioned in the introduction, civil wars are as questionable as conflicts get.  
Still, after the Bosnian conflict EU managed to pass the CFSP, that could have actually 
been helpful during the conflict. Post-war EU missions in Bosnia that were possible because 
of the new CFSP really demonstrate that EU is more than capable of peace maintaining. Yet 
even with new possibilities EU again resorted to a diplomacy only approach in Kosovo, even 
after explicitly admitting the previous failure to act in Yugoslavia. When Kosovo came 
around, it seemed that the EU has not learned from previous mistakes. Before, during and 
after the conflict the EU has, in typical EU fashion, held countless conferences, discussions, 
formal and informal meetings on the topic of EU defence. It seemed as if defence was the 
next big step that everyone was ready to make. Most member States were clearly opposed to 
forming an actual EU army, but they agreed that Europe should be capable to provide its own 
security as well as provide security for its neighbourhood. Even the ever Eurosceptic UK 
agreed on this matter in the late 1990’s. True astonishment, however, comes from the 
similarity of debate had back then to the debate we have today, best seen in relations between 
NATO and the EU in case of Kosovo conflict. NATO has plead during Kosovo war for EU to 
step up, stop making excuses related to institutional shortcomings and cut the redundancies in 
the organisation of its militaries.
237
 Looking at the debate on the issue today it is clear that the 
defence enthusiasm of the late nineties was not enough to make significant progress. History 
has repeated itself and EU’s response is once again sanctions and humanitarian aid, which are 
a logical response to a conflict but quite ineffective in actually coercing belligerents to cease 
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hostilities. This truly begs the question of how many more conflicts will have to get 
completely out of hand before European leaders decide that the loss of sovereignty in this 
policy area is less tragic than the loss of life?  
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6.3 Aftermath 
EU has been ‘repaying for its sins’ in Bosnia since the end of the conflict. The feeling of guilt 
and responsibility blatantly stated the CFSP echo throughout the relationship between these 
actors. For years EU has been providing Bosnia with funds, security and help in judicial 
branch and area justice and home affairs, combined with the possibility of becoming a 
member State in the future. All of these means can be characterised as soft power, and they 
give Bosnia an incentive to further democratise its society and try to respect the rule of law. I 
believe that the fact that EU uses its armed soldiers simply as another tool of soft power truly 
shines a light on the nature of this beast. However noble this might be, it should be a 
preferred, not only option. To some extent, Kosovo war served as the wakeup call for CFSP 
that Bosnian war should have been. Only a couple of years after Kosovo, EU was able to 
deploy its own stabilising missions to Former Yugoslavia. In Bosnia, EU troops have even 
completely replaced NATO troops, which is a great improvement to its military capabilities a 
decade prior. EU troops were also deemed successful in their mission to bring stability to law 
and peace enforcement agencies in Bosnia, further evident from the steady decline in the 
number of EU forces needed. The next step for EU is to also shine in peacekeeping during the 
conflict. 
Like in Bosnia, EU has been ‘repaying for its sins’ in Kosovo by being overly 
involved after the conflict. UNMIK, UN’s attempt to redeem for inaction during the conflict, 
had its mandate changed after Kosovo declared of independence in 2008 because of neutrality 
issue that occurred since not all UN members recognise Kosovar independence. This was an 
opportunity for the EU to swoop in, and it finally did. Military, police, justice and home 
affairs, economy and diplomacy of Kosovo were taken under the wing of the EU. However, 
the fact that not even all of the Member States recognise Kosovo as an independent state 
spoils the integrity of the EU as an international state-building actor.  
Furthermore, unlike during the wars, the EU has successfully used soft power to 
maintain peace in the region. It continues to persuade Serbia and Kosovo to maintaining a 
peaceful dialogue by promises of aid and future membership. This may be a testament to 
growth of the EU as a soft power, although it was probably only effective in combination with 
a change in leadership in Serbia. As seen from the Operation Allied Force, Milošević was not 
an actor who could be convinced by diplomatic means, since he barely agreed to peace after 
weeks of aggressive bombing.  
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Interestingly enough, while the post-war recovery depends on many other factors and 
does not directly correlate with peacekeeping forces presence, in former Yugoslavia these 
factors seem to trend the opposite way. Of all of the countries analysed in the previous 
chapters Croatia is the one where the EU was least involved in after the war, yet also the one 
that had the most successful recovery, leaps and bounds in front of Kosovo and Bosnia.  
The EU undoubtedly grew from its experience regarding Yugoslavia, which initiated 
the ESDP. The involvement in Kosovo and Bosnia after the war clearly shows a great 
increase in the EU’s military capabilities, and further shows that it is possible to perform 
successful missions as the EU, and not under the wing of NATO or the UN. After Yugoslavia, 
EU performed several missions maintaining peace in post conflict areas under the EDSP in 
places like Kongo and Tchad.
238
 Although this growth as a security actor is significant, it is 
not enough to face the security challenges of today. Decades after the Second World War and 
EU is still unable to provide security even for its immediate neighbourhood. Yugoslavia 
started the security debate, how many conflicts will need to happen to end it? 
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Conclusion 
Breakup of Yugoslavia was an unexpected major global event taking place in 1990’s that was 
followed by a series of deadly conflicts. It started after several Yugoslav republics at the time 
declared independence after holding independence referenda. The biggest of the Yugoslav 
republics, Serbia, was not fond of the breakup and it responded to separatist intentions with 
violence, resulting in several conflicts. After it became apparent that peaceful separation was 
not possible, international community became involved in finding a solution to the conflicts. 
EU was the first international actor on the scene, launching a Monitoring Mission to keep 
track of the initial outbreak of violence in Slovenia and Croatia. After the situation in Croatia 
became dire, the UN got involved in brokering a ceasefire agreement, and mandating newly 
established UNPROFOR to maintain it. Conflict did not stay confined to Croatia, and soon 
after its own declaration of independence Bosnia became the newest warzone in the Balkans. 
War in Bosnia was much more devastating than in Croatia, causing UNPROFOR to extend its 
mandate to Bosnian territory, and also causing NATO to get involved. It resulted in many 
dead and the largest displacement of persons since the Second World War. Three years after 
the conclusion of Bosnian conflict unrest began in Kosovo, quickly turning into a fully-
fledged war with dire humanitarian consequences. Attempts to solve the conflict 
diplomatically did not work and it only ended after an 11 week long NATO bombing 
campaign of Serbia that caused Serbian president Milošević to sign the peace agreement. 
EU was tasked with resolving the conflicts, yet due to the lack of enforcement 
capabilities for its peace plans, it was unable to achieve peace. Although it was the first 
international actor to get involved in Yugoslavia, its involvement remained non-military. EU 
did come up with peaceful solutions, yet it was missing hard power tools necessary to enforce 
its peace plans. Coercive tools that were available to EU were economic aid and sanctions, 
which proved to be weak and inefficient in the face of an ethnic conflict. In the end, UN and 
NATO ended up being the primary actors responsible for bringing peace in what they 
characterised as EU’s own backyard. On the other hand, EU’s post conflict involvement 
played an important role in maintaining peace in Bosnia and state building in Kosovo.  
Behaviour of the EU in the area of conflict intervention appears to be circular process 
divided in three stages: initial shock, promise of intervening next time, and finally not being 
able to intervene next time due to structural shortcomings. After witnessing one after another 
violent conflict in the Western Balkans, EU kept repeating the same mistakes in each of them. 
At present even the most recent of the Yugoslav conflicts has reached legal age, and the 
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common defence in the EU is still a matter of debate. European backyard is on fire once 
again, yet for European leaders it is still not a good enough incentive to transfer more 
sovereignty in this policy area to supranational level.  
Peace is something that Europe should strive for, not take for granted. Conflicts have a 
tendency to spill over, and there are viable treats to European security present as close as our 
external borders. Diplomacy and soft power are excellent tools; however, they should not 
make up the entire toolkit. In some cases military intervention is certainly more humane than 
doing nothing. EU needs to stop picking up the pieces after the conflict and picking up the 
weapons during.  
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